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The Importance Of Identity In Microsoft Certifications

As I’ve taken Microsoft certification exams, or the exam renewals, I’ve noticed that Azure AD and identity topics are a theme throughout. Now, focusing on the security space, it may seem like somewhat of a given.

But it made me curious – how many Microsoft certification exams have an identity component to them?

While the Microsoft Certification browser indicates 15 current exams (with four expired) that have a Microsoft Entra product component, the list has some obvious exclusions, such as AZ-900 and MS-900. Granted, those are fundamental exams, but Azure AD and Entra still come up on them in some shape or form.

I decided to dig a bit deeper, and while I have not sat for the majority of exams outside the security space, the Microsoft official exam guides often give you a good breakdown of the skills and concepts within the exams. I found that 29 exams currently have an identity component to them, that would have an estimated weight of at least 5%.

Don't Let DNS Be Your Azure AD Recovery Downfall

In September of 2022, Joey Verlinden (@jvldn1) published an excellent article on his experience with recovering access to an Azure AD tenant that he was completely locked out of. You can, and should, read the full article here, What happens if you lock-out your Azure Tenant? – Joey Verlinden.

In this, Joey details the process for recovering access to an Azure AD tenant, which includes a detailed verification process, which is rightfully put in place to ensure that someone isn’t capable of a tenant takeover through social engineer. As part of the process, the request is verified by means of either:

  • Calling the phone number associated with a Tenant
  • Emailing a Global Administrator
  • Requesting that the organization creates a DNS TXT record associated with one of the verified domains

Now, under normal “oops” scenarios, you likely could use a phone call or email to a Global Administrator. Of course, if a GA is mail-enabled, the email should be forwarded, as your Global Admins should not actually be receiving or checking email directly in that inbox (which is a different story).

Azure AD 101: Azure Subscription Relationship

Whether you are dipping your toe or diving headfirst into Azure, one of the points of confusion is the relationship between Azure Active Directory and Azure subscriptions. Azure subscriptions may be referred to as subscriptions, or sometimes even just Azure. An Azure Active Directory tenant, which is the cloud identity provider, is usually referred to as Azure AD or AAD, or sometimes just tenant.

While Microsoft has decent documentation on the relationship, I tend to find that drawing analogies along with additional visuals can help really drive the relationship home for folks. For the MS Docs article, see Add an existing Azure subscription to your tenant – Azure AD – Microsoft Entra | Microsoft Learn.

Cloud Identity Is Still The Future

In October 2022, the CTO of 37signals, David Heinemeier Hansson, published a piece on why hey.com was leaving the cloud. You can read the full article here, Why we’re leaving the cloud (hey.com); the gist of the post is that cloud is not cost-effective. More recently, InfoWorld published a piece by David Linthicum, 2023 could be the year of public cloud repatriation | InfoWorld, hitting on why it may be more cost-effective to move back to private data centers. You see the trend – cloud may not be providing the ROI that is expected, especially if your organization has just performed a bunch of lift-and-shift without application refactoring.

While the titles are attention grabbing, and the articles have valid points, they don’t really tell the full story. Folks in the industry may scan the headlines and believe that a mass cloud exodus is on the verge of happening, but we really need to look at what part of the cloud we are speaking to. We need to distinguish between IaaS, PaaS and SaaS, as well as related services and systems, such as IDaaS (identity as a service, aka Azure AD, Okta, and so on).

SpAML: Spoofing Users In Azure AD With SAML Claims Transformations

For those that believe SAML is dead, they should take a look at the Azure AD Application Gallery. While the authentication standard finished baking almost two decades ago, it’s still a staple for integration of applications with Azure AD. As of writing, the Azure AD App Gallery has 2015 applications available for SSO integration, and 1335 of them use SAML, roughly two-thirds. Beyond this, there are thousands of line-of-business (LOB) and other 3rd party applications that don’t exist in the gallery but leverage SAML. Many well-known applications and platforms are published in the gallery using SAML – Salesforce, Google Workspace/Google Cloud, AWS, SAP, Oracle Cloud, ServiceNow, Workday… the list goes on and on.

With the ease of federated identity, not only are we tying other cloud providers to Azure AD, but we are also bringing in business critical applications. With this, we need to keep in mind that threat actors are not always targeting critical IT resources; one can do plenty damage with access to records and data stored within SaaS applications.

Azure AD makes it easier than ever to spoof (impersonate) a user within a SAML response. This relatively easy technique allows us to impersonate a highly privileged user in the target application. At the same time, authentication behavior for all other users of the application, including the legitimate user being spoofed, will not change. If your organization leverages SCIM for user provisioning, which is the direction the industry is going, this lends in favor of spoofing going undetected, as optional attributes in the SAML response will go unused by the application.

Within Azure AD, you do not need to be a Global Administrator to configure an Enterprise Application. Anyone with Application Administrator, Cloud Application Administrator, or assigned Owner to a specific application can manage it. From a usability perspective, Microsoft pushes delegation of ownership to the business units. The users, however, that now can manage the application, likely fall under the bar of PIM or any privilege separation. Suffice to say, this opens our potential pool of targets in an organization; needing Global Administrator for movement into target applications is not necessary, just whoever has ownership. Likewise, it’s ripe for abuse by insider threats.